AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LAW & MEDICINE VOL. 40 NO. 2&3 2014
insurance, but as hospital and medical service payment plans, respectively; and they were governed by state laws similar to, but distinct from, other insurance licensure statutes. 5 As healthcare costs rose, commercial insurers entered the market with indemnity policies. In the early years, insurers typically paid whatever prices hospitals and physicians charged, but today's insurers negotiate prices with providers, and large insurers that have substantial bargaining power can set their own prices. Insurers also added managed care components to their plans to control costs, 6 and in many cases insurance coverage determines the kind of care that patients receive in practice.
Today, health insurance is no longer simply a class of insurance that covers risks to health, and it has not been so for many years. 7 Part II argues that health insurance has become a unique form of insurance-a mechanism to pay for healthcare that uses risk spreading as one of several pricing methods. 8 Part III explains how the ACA builds on this important payment function to create a complex social insurance system to finance healthcare for (almost) everyone. Health insurance is now so integrated into the healthcare system that we can no longer have one without the other. This shift poses challenges to laws governing health insurance policies. Part IV, therefore, examines how the ACA draws on various conceptions of insurance to produce a quasi-social insurance system. Such a system poses new challenges to laws governing insurance, not all of which are resolved by the ACA itself. I conclude that, whether or not the ACA is fully implemented, health insurance has already changed-but more nuanced questions remain about whether and how laws governing insurance licensure and claims determinations should also change.
II. CHARACTERISTICS OF HEALTH INSURANCE
Health insurance today differs from other classes of insurance in three critical respects. 9 First, it is the primary source of payment for medical care in the United States. 10 Second, because everyone needs healthcare, almost everyone needs health 5 ROBERT D. EILERS, REGULATION OF BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD PLANS 135-36 (1963 , available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme_court_preview/briefs/11 -398_petitioneramcu104healthlawprofs.authcheckdam.pdf (written together with Mark Hall, the aut hor who organized and participated in drafting the brief (along with Abbe Gluck), the characteristics of which are described in Part II, infra.) 10 Id. at 16.
insurance to pay for that care. 11 Third, health insurance is no longer designed like conventional insurance policies and thus no longer functions like conventional insurance. 12 Any one of these characteristics is enough to distinguish health insurance from conventional indemnity insurance, but together they make health insurance unique. Indeed, healthcare may be the only market that could not exist in its current form-providing today's sophisticated services-without third party payers. 13 
A. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE COVERAGE PAYS FOR MOST MEDICAL CARE
Americans pay for most of their healthcare with health insurance, not cash. In 2009, they used public and private insurance to pay for 85.7% of their personal healthcare expenditures.
14 Only 12.8% was paid out-of-pocket for insurance deductibles and co-payments, over-the-counter medication costs and other health service expenses not covered by insurance. 15 The vast majority of health insurance payments go directly to providers to pay for care-medical services, procedures, medications and devices. 16 The practice of reimbursing patients for their out-of-pocket payments to providers is the exception today. 17 When a person needs medical care, her health insurance pays the physicians, hospitals and laboratories for the services rendered to the patient. In this respect, both private commercial health insurance and public benefit programs like Medicare function in the same manner. Thus, the average person is likely to think of her health plan as the entity that pays for her medical care. To be sure, insurance does not pay for some services, but these are the minority-accounting for less than fifteen percent of national personal health expenditures.
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There is no other product that is purchased with insurance benefits. One might argue that repairs to one's house or car are often paid directly by homeowners or car insurance. However, that analogy ignores an important distinction. Individuals do not seek repairs in a vacuum. First, they must buy a house or a car with money from their own assets or a loan. Then they may buy insurance to pay for any repairs needed in the future. Later, if damage occurs, they may call upon insurance to pay for repairs, but they do not use car insurance proceeds to buy the car in the first place.
In contrast, individuals seek health insurance to buy the initial "product" -healthcare-before seeking that care. One might claim that health insurance is like a car loan obtained to buy the car in the first place, except that the "loan" does not have to be repaid. Health insurance is not analogous to car insurance, unless we 11 See id. at 5. 12 Mariner, supra note 8, at 443. 13 See Brief of 104 Health Law Professors, supra note 9, at 7-10. 14 CTRS. FOR consider the human body to be the original product and health insurance as the source of payment for repairs to the body. Of course, the human body is not a product; the Thirteenth Amendment has prohibited treating a human being as a commodity since 1865.
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In his opinion on the ACA's individual mandate in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, Chief Justice John Roberts rejected the idea that health insurance differs from car insurance. 20 Very few things are purchased for their own sake, he asserted: a car is purchased for transportation to go places. 21 If health insurance is similarly purchased for an ultimate purpose, as the Chief Justice implied, that purpose can only be to buy healthcare, which, under his reasoning, is itself purchased for the further purpose of getting well. This theory makes analogies-a mainstay of legal reasoning-unmanageable. At issue is the source of payment for products or services like cars and healthcare. Intangible states of being, like going places and getting well, are not products that can be bought. Buying health insurance is at least one step too far removed from buying a car to satisfy the Chief Justice's attempt at analogy.
A. THE UNIVERSAL NEED FOR HEALTH INSURANCE
Insurance is used to pay for most healthcare because healthcare is often extremely expensive and unpredictable. To be sure, some other purchases can be expensive and unpredictable. But, healthcare is not an optional good. Almost everyone needs some sort of healthcare at one time or another during their lives.
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The National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) reports that only 1% of adults have never visited a healthcare professional in their lifetimes. 23 Of course, the need for healthcare varies over a lifetime. Yet, most Americans use healthcare frequently. The same NCHS survey reports that 95.9% of adults had visited a healthcare professional within the preceding 5 years, and 82.5% had done so within the preceding year. 24 Children see healthcare providers even more often. 29 and the median net worth was about $120,000. 30 More than half the population does not have enough income or assets to pay for this type of care.
The cost is exacerbated by the unpredictability of major illnesses and injuries. 31 One never really knows when a devastating medical crisis will occur. This makes it difficult, if not impossible, to plan or save for future care. Moreover, when illness strikes, patients have little control over the treatments they receive-and therefore their costs-typically relying on physician recommendations. Thus, patients are often faced with the kind of personal and financial crises that can only be financed by the cost-spreading techniques of insurance. Of course, insurance is useful for expensive and unpredictable events, such as the loss of one's house in a fire or flood. But, few expensive products are necessities. Food, water, shelter, and clothing are necessities, but they are not unpredictable. Unlike medical care, these necessities are essentially the same for all human beings. The quantity and quality sufficient to sustain survival are predictable. Also unlike medical care, consumers can choose what clothes, housing, and food to buy without professional intervention. These necessities generally are available at affordable prices. To be sure, too many indigent persons are unable to afford healthy food and safe housing without social assistance. Nevertheless, there is no imperative to use insurance to buy food, water, housing, or clothing.
Despite many who consider healthcare to be a commercial good that should be allocated through commercial markets, more Americans treat healthcare like a necessity and a public good. 32 The public generally responds to an individual in an emergency by providing rescue. 33 Professional medical ethics has long recognized physicians' responsibilities to help patients in an emergency. 34 State court decisions have incorporated this ethic into common law, while state and federal legislation has codified it for hospitals with emergency departments, requiring care for emergency medical conditions regardless of ability to pay. 35 Even though limited to emergencies, this sense of responsibility distinguishes medical care from commercial goods. Medical facilities do not refuse care to anyone whose life could be saved by immediate intervention, whether or not the facilities will be paid for the services they provide. Commercial vendors, however, do not typically provide food, housing, or automobiles to individuals who cannot pay for them. Coverage of preventive services is an anomaly in conventional insurance. Expenses that are likely or certain to occur are not considered insurable risks. 36 Traditionally, insurance covered only risks that were unforeseeable by the insured, for sensible reasons. 37 From the insured's perspective, it makes little sense to buy insurance to pay for a service, like an influenza immunization, that the insured already plans to buy. The insurance premium would be more expensive than the price of the immunization alone.
Health insurance coverage of preventive and other planned services resulted from both insurance regulation and market demand. State insurance licensure legislation introduced required coverage of selected preventive services as a matter of social policy. 38 The purpose of such laws was to encourage people who might not bother or could not afford to get regular preventive examinations to do so in order to avoid more serious (and costly) diseases in the future. 39 Mandated benefits for preventive services have been a common feature of insurance regulation in most states for many years.
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Foreseeable medical care goes beyond prevention; it includes expected treatment for existing medical conditions. A person with diabetes, kidney disease, or hypertension, for example, can expect to need a variety of medical services that would not typically be covered by traditional commercial indemnity insurance. Bo th state and federal laws later imposed some limits, such as the length of time that insurers could exclude coverage of preexisting conditions. 41 The ACA eliminates these and other vestiges of traditional insurance.
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Even before the ACA became law, health insurance had evolved, sometimes voluntarily, sometimes with a push from government, into a singular species of insurance. The insurance "product" that Chief Justice Roberts described was already dying out. 43 Health insurance no longer functioned exclusively as a way to spread 36 
III. HEALTH INSURANCE AS SOCIAL INSURANCE
Health insurance has become as necessary as healthcare. 45 Without health insurance, most Americans could not obtain the healthcare they need, except in emergencies. The ACA was written in recognition of this reality. The goal of making healthcare available to all (or virtually all) could only be financed through modern health insurance methods. Thus, the ACA cemented a broader social function for health insurance, employing it to serve the goal of access to affordable healthcare for all. 46 In order to enable most Americans to get care, the ACA preserved the financial risk-spreading function of insurance for expensive care, while ending the last traces of risk selection and underwriting that would exclude coverage of beneficial, but predictable, services.
47 These steps were necessary to make healthcare both affordable and available to almost the entire population, whether used by a government program or by private insurance.
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The ACA fills the gaps in the fragmented array of public and private health insurance programs and links them together into a social insurance system. As Rashi Fein has stated, the ACA is an overall program that is "compulsory for the population group covered, contributory, and earmarked, with contributions that are not adjusted for risk and therefore are redistributive." 49 In this system, private health insurance serves a function similar to that of worker compensation insurance, unemployment insurance, Social Security, and Medicare; that is to say, it ensures that those in need of assistance have access to a source of funding for that aid. 45 See INST. OF MED., AMERICA'S UNINSURED CRISIS: CONSEQUENCES FOR HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE 49 (2009), available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12511 ("For people without health insurance, there is a chasm between health care needs and access to needed services despite the availability of some safety net services. With health insurance, children are more likely to gain access to a medical home, well-child care and immunizations, prescription medications, appropriate care for asthma, and basic dental services. They are also more likely to have fewer avoidable hospitalizations, improved asthma outcomes, and fewer missed days of school. Uninsured adults face serious and sometime [sic] grave risk to their health. Without health insurance, adults have less access to effective clinical services including preventive care and, if sick or injured, are more likely to suffer poorer health outcomes, greater limitations in quality of life, and premature death. When adults gain health insurance, they experience improved access to effective clinical services and better health outcomes.").
46 STARR, supra note 2, at 241. Care for "all," of course, remains something of an overstatement, since twenty-three states, as of this writing, have declined to participate in the Medicaid expansion. Moreover, the ACA does not require undocumented aliens to have insurance coverage. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., THE IMPACT OF THE COVERAGE GAP IN 51 Richard Ericson and colleagues explain that insurance is "a moral technology" in the sense that it "defines how people should act." 52 Jeffrey Stempel has described the insurance policy itself as a social institution, "often acting as adjunct arms of governance and reflecting social and commercial norms." 53 As more people are able to obtain health insurance, whether public or private, the idea of having health insurance becomes routine and expected. Because insurance is a means of spreading costs, the expectation of health insurance suggests that the cost of healthcare is a shared responsibility-at least to the extent of the benefits it covers. 54 In the most fundamental sense, Chief Justice Roberts was correct to characterize the ACA's individual mandate as a tax. 55 Premiums paid for social insurance function much like taxes. As Henry Aaron noted, the payroll taxes that fund Social Security and Medicare are analogous to insurance premiums, except that the payroll taxes are more regressive than income taxes, because they are the same percentage of income, up to a cap, for everyone.
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In a 1927 Supreme Court case concerning taxes on insurance premiums, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes famously wrote in a dissenting opinion, " [t] axes are what we pay for civilized society, including the chance to insure." 57 In Justice Holmes's view, the premium tax is a paid for the social and economic protections provided by the state, including the opportunity to conduct business in a fair and secure environment. Today's insurance premiums are analogous to such taxes. Even when paid to private industry, they finance the care needed to live and work in society.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR HEALTH INSURANCE
Why should it matter that health insurance has become the primary method of paying for healthcare and a form of social insurance? There are at least two reasons. First, the shift challenges the conventional conception of insurance as a voluntary, commercial relationship between insurer and insured, but it does not necessarily offer universally acceptable, normative standards on how insurance law should respond to this "new" relationship. This injects some new uncertainties into an area of law already beset by competing conceptions of the role of insurance in general. Second, recognizing health insurance as a payment system should focus more attention on the kinds of care that should be available to everyone. If health insurance is to function as a form of social insurance, who decides what coverage is individual's exposure to the long-and short-term risks which interrupted income flow: accident, sickness and maternity, old age and invalidity, unemployment, or death resulting in im poverished dependency."). 51 essential? Government regulation and private market contracting are likely to offer different, albeit also incomplete, answers. Each of these is discussed below.
A. A SOCIAL INSURANCE CONCEPTION OF HEALTH INSURANCE
The ACA's social insurance conception of health insurance partially straddles four conceptions of insurance delineated by Kenneth Abraham. 58 The "contract conception" is what Abraham calls the "traditional and dominant conception of insurance . . . as a contract transferring risk of loss to a party whose business is selling such contracts, rather than as an incident of another transaction." 59 The "product conception" views the insurance policy more like a commodity than a contract; the product could be found defective under rules, like products liability, defining the validity of contract terms, rather than generally deferring to the text of standard form contracts used in insurance to define rights and obligations. 60 The "public utility/regulated industry conception" views insurance much like a natural monopoly, such as the water or electricity markets, which are highly regulated "in order to serve the public interest."
61 The "governance conception," first propounded by Richard V. Ericson and colleagues, 62 describes how insurance functions much like (and can serve as a substitute for) a government to the extent that it influences the behavior of those insured to prevent or mitigate risks. 63 Elements of each of these conceptions of insurance are discernable in the ACA, but none wholly encompasses the overall function of the healthcare financing methods that the ACA contemplates. Of course, Abraham's analysis focuses on private insurance, whereas health insurance-pre-and post-ACA-includes both private plans and public programs. To be sure, the ACA intensifies regulation of private, commercial health insurers and their policies. Abraham notes that health insurance is the insurance field most closely aligned with the public utility conception. 64 But he concludes that it is not a complete match, because, unlike public utilities, which charge consumers according to their use of the service, health insurance under the ACA redistributes risk. 65 Medicare, Medicaid, and the Veterans Affairs health benefits programs might also share some similarities with public utilities, but they are more properly viewed as government benefit or entitlement programs-redistributive tax and transfer programs-and not regulated industries.
In a social insurance system, a health plan is a means rather than an end-a method of financing expected costs, rather than a commercial contract or product to 58 Abraham, supra note 21, at 657. 59 Id. at 658. A key focus of the contract conception is the degree to which the contract's text governs the specific losses for which the insurer will pay, as well as the rules for interpreting that text. 60 64 Id. at 670. Given the redistribution of former monopolies, such as telephone services, into competing private companies, the traditional public utility model that Abraham describes applies to a narrower set of industries today. Companies offering competing landline and mobile telephone, cable, or wireless internet services, for example, might offer a modified model of public utilities, with somewhat less regulation, especially with respect to pricing, than traditional public ut ilities. 65 Id. at 672. 66 As discussed below, the contract conception remains alive and well within the ACA's framework, because contracts will continue to specify many details of the insurer-insured relationship, including entitlement to specific treatments. 67 Nonetheless, when insurance is used to finance a goal like access to healthcare, the insurance contract or "product" itself must be designed to achieve that goal, instead of other goals the insurer may prefer.
In the public financing systems, like Medicare and healthcare for military personnel and soldiers, legislation specifies the legal and policy framework for an entire program, with administrative rules filling in the details. When multiple private insurers are used to finance healthcare, more complex regulation is needed to ensure that private entities, working independently, offer insurance plans that are designed to achieve the public goal of financing healthcare. 68 The more a financing system relies on the private sector, the more regulation of private entities will be required to achieve the overall goal. This means that legislation and regulations will increasingly shape the boundaries of health insurance coverage and pricing.
The ACA continues to rely on the states to license and regulate insurers and their policies, but it also imposes new federal requirements. Insurance commissioners now need to regulate according to federal as well as state law. This includes evaluating the actuarial value of qualified health plans to be sold on health insurance exchanges, 69 sure that insurers are financially solvent, much less to review each policy for its actuarial soundness and compliance with pre-ACA consumer protection rules. 76 Now, they must also determine whether the policies offered on health insurance exchanges comply with all the federal rules. 77 State insurance departments may also need to review and approve insurers' participation agreements with providers, since these agreements may be key to ensuring that premiums are adequate to cover expected outlays. 78 Moreover, if consumers are supposed to choose health plans wisely, they may need to know how an insurer pays its providers and perhaps even how providers pay themselves. 79 This requires more transparency than is currently provided. 80 Payments to providers are likely to be the primary target for cost control. There is little dispute that such payments have grown faster than the cost of living or that provider prices often appear arbitrary. 81 The ACA authorizes experiments to encourage providers to work together to provide care more efficiently at lower prices in accountable care organizations and other arrangements, but providers still have little incentive to reduce their own incomes without pressure from insurers. 82 The degree to which 76 See id. at 142 (emphasizing the constrained budgets and staffing conditions in insurance departments). 77 87 Some may prefer care that maintains or restores normal function, while others simply want to survive, regardless of disability.
88 Some may think of healthcare as limited only to services that diagnose, treat or cure disease, while others may include services to prevent illness or even achieve optimal health status. Furthermore, an individual's own preference may vary, depending upon whether she acts as a consumer buying insurance or a patient in need of care for herself or a loved one. Societal level views of essential care also vary. Indeed, one could question whether some societies accurately or adequately represent any consensus on the part of their populations. Where governments act honestly, essential care could properly be based on many different factors, such as population size, age distribution, and available resources. What is essential to any society may also depend on its need for economic growth, which may favor services that preserve productivity, or participation in civic life, which may favor other services, or some other human function. But, given the variation in individual preferences in a population as diverse as that of the United States, any societal level choice, no matter how thoughtfully produced, may conflict in whole or in part with the views of individuals or groups within the population.
Essential Health Benefits under the ACA
Majority rule may-or may not-be the appropriate normative standard to determine essential care at the more abstract level of general categories of coverage. The ACA appears to assume that it is by requiring private insurers to cover EHB in all plans that they offer to sell on a health insurance exchange or in the individual and small group market (but excluding grandfathered plans of large employers).
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EHB must be similar in scope to a "typical employer plan" and must include the following ten categories of medical services: ambulatory; emergency; inpatient hospitalization; maternity and newborn; mental health and substance abuse; prescription drugs; rehabilitation; laboratory; preventive; and pediatric (including dental and vision care). 91 The Federal Secretary of Health and Human Services is charged with defining EHB, and is required to take the following specific "considerations" into account: the categories must be balanced, without giving undue weight to any one category; coverage should not discriminate on the basis of age, disability, or expected length of life; EHB should take into account the needs of diverse groups, including women, children, and people with disabilities; benefits should not be denied on the basis of age, expected length of life, present or predicted disability, degree of medical dependency, or quality of life.
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This general definition of EHB is quite comprehensive, and the "considerations" make it difficult to narrow the categories or to make decisions about how they might apply to individual patients. 93 So far, this rather vague and flexible definition of EHBs is based on state choices of typical small employer plan coverage-in effect, trickling up from insurers. 94 But it does represent a step toward developing 90 42 U.S.C. § § 18021-18022 (2012) . 91 Id. § 18022(b)(1). 92 Id. § 18022(b)(4). 93 Not surprisingly, the Secretary avoided listing specific benefits, instead issuing a rule granting the states the opportunity to decide what benefits plans will cover in their states. Essential Health Benefits, Actuarial Value, and Accreditation, 78 Fed. Reg. 12,833-12,872 (Feb. 25, 2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 147, 155-56). A state may choose one of several existing health plans sold to small employers in that state (called a "benchmark plan"), and the benefits covered by that plan will be deemed to qualify as EHB. The benchmark plan, however, must be supplemented if it fails to cover any of the 10 required categories. Id. 94 See id. While ACA states that Essential Health Benefits should be similar in scope to the benefits covered by a "typical employer plan," it does not distinguish between large employer plans and small employer plans. Small employer plans typically offer fewer benefits and more limited coverage of those benefits than large employer plans in order to keep premiums affordable. Thus, a typical small employer plan usually has a lower actuarial value than a large employer plan. To counter rising premiums, companies have increased the amounts that employees pay for health plans -both the employee's share of premiums and deductibles and co-payments for receiving care. consensus on the basic types of care that should be available to all. The benefits covered by large employee group plans are already similar. Greater consensus on essential coverage may emerge in the future, ideally with public input, and national standards may begin to trickle down from the state or federal government to insurers. Experiments with Medicare and Medicaid coverage and provider payment methods also may begin to incorporate the same or similar conception of essential health benefits, so that benefit packages in both public and private health plans may converge more closely than in the past. 95 Of course, supplementary private insurance and personal funds will undoubtedly remain available to pay for elective and boutique services. Nonetheless, similar public and private benefit packages would reinforce consensus on what counts as care to which everyone should have access.
Similar coverage across many plans facilitates comparisons for consumers. In theory, consumers need only compare prices for the same set of benefits. In health insurance, however, a plan's participating providers are also a major factor in consumers' choice of health plans, even if often secondary to price.
Coverage and Treatment Decisions -Contracts Again
Paradoxically, variation in EHB definitions can perpetuate a problem that the EHB requirement itself was intended to resolve or at least reduce-inconsistent or inadequate treatment coverage. Historically, the fact that different insurers covered different benefits meant that people with the same medical condition would not necessarily receive the same treatment. 96 The remaining variation among the several public benefit programs and hundreds of private insurance plans can provoke complaints of unfair rationing, especially if a person who is denied treatment believes that the denial was not based on medical need, but on an insurer's profit targets. 97 More uniform coverage of the same benefits could avoid the rationing charge by assuring that everyone is subject to the same rules. The knowledge that resources are being used for a public purpose, such as providing needed education or Blakely, Employers, Workers, and the Future of Employment-Based Health Benefits, 330 EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. 4 (2010) . The ACA, however, limits out-of-pocket co-payments. 42 U.S.C. § 18022(c)(2). Moreover, a small employer may have few affordable choices, so its plan may not cover the benefits that employees prefer. However, since the majority of people who will be entering the market are individuals and employees of small businesses, it may make sense to use a small employer plan as a benchmark. 95 , http://www.healthlaw.org/issues/medicaid/health-reform-andmedicaid/overview-of-hhs-proposed-rule-on-benefits-for-the-medicaid-expansion-population-a-steguideffor-advocates#.UymmYqDIpLE (discussing Medicaid Alternative Benefit Plans, which starting in 2014 are required to either meet all ten EHB benefit categories or be supplemented to make them comparable to a relevant EHB-based benchmark plan). 96 See Amanda Cassidy, Essential Health Benefits, HEALTH AFF., HEALTH POL'Y BRIEF 1-2 (May 2, 2013),. http://healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief_pdfs/healthpolicybrief_91.pdf (noting the historical absence of a uniform national standard for health insurance benefits and discussing the vast differences in coverage among plans before the Affordable Care Act required coverage of essential health benefits). 97 services for children, can increase public acceptance of limits as a shared sacrifice . On one hand, the breadth of the statutory definition of EHB will make it difficult to limit the total package of benefits. On the other hand, the Secretary's decision to use state-based benchmark plans to define EHB means that the details of each benefit category will continue to vary, so that individuals might still complain of unfair treatment, thereby threatening public acceptance.
While the ACA intends to provide more uniform coverage of EHBs, the process of determining what kinds of care patients receive may not dramatically change for the foreseeable future. Most insurance plans and benefit programs necessarily define covered benefits in quite general terms much like the statutory definition of EHB. Given the breadth of required coverage, the decisions most important to patients -exactly what treatment will and will not be paid for within the general categories-remain with the insurer.
Because the United States has so many different insurance plans, both the decision maker and the law governing the determination of claims for treatment vary. Federal government programs like Medicare prescribe general benefit categories in legislation, but specific determinations on whether and when specific items and services are covered are a matter of administrative law. 98 The Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid (CMS) issues regulations and guidance interpreting the statute and describing what will and will not be paid for. 99 However, the federal agency does not make decisions about individual patient care. 100 Instead, CMS contracts with private contractors to do so on its behalf. 101 Typically, these contractors are insurance companies, which have experience handling claims, usually because they have a separate private insurance business of their own.
102 Different contractors handle claims in different regions of the country, so it is possible to have inconsistency in claims determination. In the case of disputes, patients have a statutory right to appeal the denial of payment to Medicare's administrative appeals process, which is a unified federal system with greater consistency in results. Medicaid programs offer somewhat less consistency. Although Medicaid is a federal program with legislatively prescribed benefit categories, the states administer the program and can voluntarily, or with a federal waiver, cover additional or alternative benefits. 104 Most state Medicaid programs make individual patient care determinations directly through a state Medicaid administrative agency. 105 However, most states also contract with private insurers to enroll some Medicaid beneficiaries in a managed care plan. 106 The insurer makes the initial benefit coverage determination for beneficiaries enrolled in its Medicaid plan.
107 Disputes, however, are subject to a state's administrative agency review, often with a dedicated appeals board. 108 Contract law governs individual benefit determinations for patients who are enrolled in private insurance plans. Despite drawing on many of the same common law principles, the judiciary in different states can apply somewhat different substantive and procedural rules with varying results. Claims determination often depends on specific contract provisions, especially those that exclude experimental procedures and those that limit coverage to treatments that are medically necessary for the individual patient. 109 Here, decision-making is likely to continue to operate under a contract conception of insurance. That conception, however, does not necessarily produce consistent treatment determinations for patients in the same or similar circumstances. Indeed, doctrinal disputes that often occur in the context of all types of insurance policies will undoubtedly continue to arise with respect to claims determinations under health plans: the degree to which an insurance contract should be treated as a contract of adhesion, 110 application of contra proferentem to construe ambiguous contract terms against the insurer as drafter, 111 whether the parties are bound by the text of contract provisions or the reasonable expectations of the insured, 112 the scope of subrogation clauses and whether state subrogation laws are preempted by Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 113 and the requirements for an insurer's defense to a claim of bad faith. 114 Most private insurers provide internal review (conducted by the insurer itself) of enrollee complaints, including disputes over benefit denials, and the ACA requires almost all insurers to offer a more transparent internal appeal process covering more categories of complaints.
115 Enrollees who are dissatisfied with the internal review decision have very different options, depending on their particular insurer and plan. In theory, patients can sue a private insurer under state law for claims denials and other causes of action. 116 However, the role of courts in determining claims has diminished somewhat in the past decade, for several reasons. Perhaps the most important has been the growing prevalence of mandatory arbitration clauses in private insurance contracts, which preclude an enrollee from bringing a lawsuit to require payment for treatment or to recover damages for negligence or other violations of law. 117 The United States Supreme Court has also limited the causes of action available to patients who are enrolled in an employer's group health plan.
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Patients in such plans who claim wrongful denial of benefits must sue the employer's plan under the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act, not state law. 119 If successful, the patients are entitled to recover only the cost of the treatment denied and not any damages for personal injury.
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A third reason for fewer court actions is the growth of external review systems. Almost all states now require insurers to submit certain disputes to a review panel that is entirely independent of the insurer. 121 Having one's claim reviewed by an unbiased expert or group of experts often satisfies patients that their claims have been evaluated fairly, regardless of the outcome. 122 The ACA greatly expands the use of external review panels, requiring their use for almost all insurers, except certain employer-sponsored group health plans.
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The ACA leaves in place a multiplicity of processes and decision-makers for determining individual claims, including public administrative procedures, private review procedures, private arbitration, and judicial process. 124 The Act does not specify how decisions are made in individual cases. With rising healthcare costs, both public and private insurers are likely to face pressure to make sure that t hey pay 126 Even where courts issue opinions, their decisions often focus on the specific circumstances of an individual patient and therefore create little precedent for other individual decisions. 127 
The Role of Costs
Using health insurance as a financing mechanism has the potential to reshape the healthcare delivery system. Today's healthcare system was strongly influenced by what health insurance plans covered and excluded and how much they paid providers. 128 A financing system must decide what services are worth paying for and how much to pay for them. Ultimately, healthcare must be affordable to everyone, not just those who voluntarily buy insurance. With everyone in the system, savings cannot be achieved by risk selection or exclusion from coverage, as with voluntary, commercial insurance. Contributions or premiums of individuals in the group need not correspond to their individual risks; individual contributions, whether in premiums or taxes, may be relatively equal or income based, as long as aggregate revenues are available to pay for the needs of everyone in the group. 129 This means increased pressure to control healthcare costs, with greater scrutiny of payments to providers and taking value more explicitly into account. 130 Although a major impetus for the Act was the growing cost of care, 131 the ACA does not expressly require either reductions or changes in the method of payment for healthcare. 132 Instead, supporters believe that once everyone is insured, the country will have no choice but to take affirmative steps to control costs. 133 Since most of the ACA's reforms do not take effect until 2014, noticeable cost control is unlikely for many years. 134 Competing goals of essential coverage and affordable costs have already challenged the process of making Medicare coverage decisions 135 and developing a standard Essential Health Benefits package. 136 This means that the rising cost of care will significantly affect the kind of care that insurance actually pays for, at least for some years to come.
In practice, insurers still bear primary responsibility for controlling costs, but their options are limited. The requirement that insurers cover EHB, however defined, constrains insurers' ability to limit benefits as a way to control costs. The ACA also limits the permissible extent of cost-sharing for patients, which is another traditional way to shift costs. 137 In principle, insurers could reduce their own administrative costs and profits, but new regulations, such as reporting requirements, 138 may add to administrative efforts, and for-profit companies are under pressure from investors to increase profits. 139 One ACA skeptic argues that the ACA's requirement that insurers spend at least eighty percent of premiums on benefits could backfire by encouraging insurers to increase premiums and cover more services for the purpose of preserving executive compensation and profit levels. 140 This leaves provider payments as a primary target for controlling costs. Although payment is a strong influence on provider behavior, it remains a crude instrument for reducing waste. Insurers do not necessarily have the expertise to finetune payment mechanisms to achieve both financial efficiency and medical effectiveness in individual treatment decisions. This raises the question, noted above, of whether insurance regulators should assume responsibility for overseeing insurer payments to providers. 141 To complicate matters, if providers in ACOs are responsible for providing care, but specific items and services are not specified in the contract, it will be providers who make the decisions about exactly what the patient receives. 142 In case of a dispute, who is responsible-the insurer, the provider, or both? Such questions are reminiscent of earlier controversies over medical necessity determinations by managed care organizations. 143 Should it matter whether the provider has accepted full or partial financial risk for patient care? If the Over the past four decades, health insurance has evolved from its original indemnity structure into the primary means of paying for healthcare. The ACA gathers various public benefit programs and private insurance plans into a loosely knit but near universal healthcare payment system. This framework combines aspects of several conceptions of insurance to create a peculiarly American form of social insurance distinct from any single conception.
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The ACA is intended to provide near-universal health insurance coverage for the purpose of enabling Americans to obtain needed medical care. In this respect, health insurance performs a governance function by financing and distributing healthcare. The ACA seeks greater consistency in health insurance coverage by regulating the terms of most plans. Such requirements bear some resemblance to product standards in a product conception of insurance. The ACA also regulates the commercial practices of private insurers, suggesting that private health insurance industry is being treated-and should be regulated to some extent-like a modern public utility.
The requirement that private health insurance plans sold on the new health insurance exchanges cover Essential Health Benefits is a major step toward greater consistency in coverage across the population. However, that requirement does not apply to all health plans, and the current definition of Essential Health Benefits lacks specification. As a result, decisions about covered care at the patient level will continue to be made by many different decision makers, just as they are now. Each decision maker, whether public or private, will continue to determine-according to different rules of procedure and interpretation-whether the general categories of benefits include something that a provider recommends or a patient seeks. At the level of payment for patient care, health insurance is likely to operate within the contract conception of insurance.
The ACA should challenge us to think in terms of a new conception of health insurance that could help answer the remaining questions about how to regulate insurers and their plans. Abraham warns that no single conception of insurance provides fully developed normative standards, at least for interpreting the meaning of insurance policies. 145 Yet, the ACA has taken the first step in the process to provide general standards for health insurance coverage. The next step is to reevaluate the normative standards in insurance law that govern what insurers must do for insureds at the level of patient care.
